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Introduction 
 Living in California means living in a state with great natural beauty.  Yet that beauty 
comes at a price, and many times the state’s geography has exacted that price through natural 
disasters, such as fires, floods and earthquakes.  Disasters such as the great 1906 San Francisco 
Earthquake, the 1989 Loma Prieta and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes, and the Southern 
California wildfires of 2003, are part of the state’s history and lore, but more importantly, these 
events serve as reminders of the state’s potential to wreak havoc on the lives of its residents.  
California residents live with the daily threat of the next disaster such as a large earthquake, and 
are constantly reminded to prepare for the next “Big One.”  According to the United States 
Geological Survey, (USGS) publication, Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country, “If you do 
not prepare for the next big quake in the Bay Area, you and your family could be left without a 
home, food and water, medical supplies, and financial resources” (U.S. Geological Survey, 
2012c, p. 32).  The USGS estimates that the chances of California experiencing a magnitude 6.7 
or greater earthquake over the next 30 years is about 67%, with the probability for a quake 
greater than magnitude 6.7 in the San Francisco Bay Area at 63% (U.S. Geological Survey, 
2012a).  The USGS refers to these quakes as “inevitable” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012c, p. 3)   
 As a result of these dynamics, and with the likelihood of confronting a natural disaster 
within the next thirty years, comprehensive emergency management programs at the local, 
county and state levels of government are essential.   California’s concentration on preparedness 
is significant, but improvements are still required.   According to a report issued by the State of 
California Little Hoover Commission in 2006, “…the State has not even begun to plan for a 
catastrophic event that would quickly overwhelm local and regional response capacity, 
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precipitate cascading disasters, destroy critical infrastructure and hobble commerce” (State of 
California Little Hoover Commission, 2006, p. 1). 
  This research examined a facet of Santa Clara County’s local emergency and disaster 
preparedness by examining levels of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
participation within the county’s fifteen cities.  Utilizing the managerial audit method, the study 
examines current levels of participation in each city as a percentage of population, and attempts 
to determine what factors enhance or detract from citizen participation.    
 When the next natural or man-made disaster occurs, people are going to look to their 
local first responders to provide aid and assistance as “emergency preparedness begins at the 
local level” (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010, p. 1).  However, as witnessed in the 
Hurricane Katrina and Loma Prieta responses, local first-responders are likely to be initially 
overwhelmed.   A myriad of factors, such as freeway overpass failures, mass casualties, and 
collapse of communication systems may prevent and/or impede the response of the emergency 
services communities rely on daily.  Current emergency management practice recognizes that not 
only do conventional emergency services have a role in a disaster, but so too, do businesses, non-
governmental agencies and the general public.  In fact, according to one author, the general 
public has the responsibility to,” ...decrease their own vulnerability and assist in the overall 
community response” (Haddow, Bullock & Coppola, 2011, p. 101).     
 During, and after a major disaster, citizens will try to help themselves, their family and 
neighbors.  However, untrained and unprepared volunteers can compromise the safety of 
themselves and others as was seen following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake which killed 
more than 10,000 people and injured over 30,000 (CERT Los Angeles, 2012b).  Volunteers were 
able to save 800 people, yet tragically, 100 volunteers perished trying to help others (CERT Los 
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Angeles, 2012b)  (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012c).  Many lessons were learned 
from Mexico City, but perhaps none as relevant as that by training members of the public “in 
needed life saving skills with emphasis on decision making skills, rescuer safety and doing the 
greatest good for the greatest number” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012c, 
Introduction section, para. 4), the general public becomes an asset versus a liability when disaster 
strikes.  In 1985, the Los Angeles City Fire Department did just that, and is credited with being 
the organization that developed and first implemented the Community Emergency Response 
Team or CERT program.  The program trains volunteer response teams in basic first aid, basic 
fire suppression, and light search and rescue.  The first team of 30 people completed training in 
1986, proving that through training, drills and exercises, the concept of training civilians to 
prepare for disasters and emergencies was feasible.  Today, CERT programs and training exist in 
“all 50 states, three territories and six foreign countries” (CERT Los Angeles, 2012a).  The 
CERT website lists California as having 336 programs, although the actual number may be 
higher (Citizen Corps, 2012a). 
 
Brief History of Emergency Management, FEMA and CERT in the United States 
Early Days 
 Emergency management in the United States is considered to have begun with the 
Congressional Act of 1803 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012a).  This act provided 
disaster relief in the form of an extension on tariffs and duties to merchants in the city of 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire following a widespread fire (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2012a).  From 1803 to 1930, ad hoc federal legislation was passed for relief or 
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compensation for more than 100 natural disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2012a).   
 During the 1930s the federal government’s involvement in emergency management and 
disaster relief and compensation became more accepted (Waugh, 2007).  In 1932, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and, in 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads were given 
authority to provide funding and loans for repair and reconstruction of public facilities, highways 
and bridges damaged by natural disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012a).   
The Flood Control Act of 1936 was passed because of a history of flooding along the Mississippi 
River, and gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers authority over flood control projects (Waugh, 
2000) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012a).  In 1933, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) was created by congressional charter to create dams to control flooding along 
the Tennessee River, as well as encourage economic development and generate electricity 
(Waugh, 2000) (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2012).   
The 1950s 
 
 During WWII, civil defense programs such as air raid warnings and emergency shelters 
began to emerge as part of the federal government’s early emergency management programs 
(Waugh, 2000) (Schroeder, Wamsley, & Ward, 2001). When the Soviets exploded their first 
atomic bomb, planning for atomic warfare became a reality, and civil defense had a new focus 
(Waugh, 2000).  A nationwide system of civil defense agencies was created when Congress 
passed The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (Waugh, 2000).   The Act “gave the federal 
government the authority to initiate planning and provide state and local governments with 
“guidance, coordination, assistance, training and matching grants for the procurement of supplies 
and equipment” (Schroeder et al., 2001, p.361).  Also passed in 1950, the Federal Disaster Relief 
7 
 
Act enabled the federal government to provide direct disaster assistance to state and local 
governments (Waugh, 2000).   The Act was notable for three reasons:  it established permanent 
authority for federal action; it shifted responsibility for declaring a disaster from Congress to the 
White House, and lastly, even though stating that primary responsibility for disaster response lay 
with state and local governments and federal response was to be supplemental, the Act 
formalized and committed the federal government to provide limited assistance following a 
disaster (Rubin, 2007b).   
The 1960s 
 During the 1960s, a number of large-scale natural disasters tested and demonstrated the 
weaknesses of existing response systems as the federal government attempted to balance 
maintaining an effective civil defense system while also dealing with natural and technological 
disasters (Waugh, 2007).  
 On Good Friday, March 27, 1964, Alaska was struck by an earthquake that began at 5:36 
P.M., lasted for nearly four minutes, and registered 9.2 on the moment magnitude (Mw) scale, 
making it the second largest earthquake in recorded history (Waugh, 2000) (U.S.Geological 
Survey, 2012b).   Across Alaska, the earthquake caused ground fissures, collapsed buildings, 
caused landslides and generated tsunamis which were measured as far away as Chile and Japan 
(Waugh, 2000). The quake and tsunamis were responsible for 131 deaths (Waugh, 2000).  To aid 
the stricken state, President Lyndon Johnson established the Federal Reconstruction and 
Development Planning Commission for Alaska (Rubin, 2007a).  The commission, in cooperation 
with the state, was charged with developing reconstruction plans and making recommendations 
for future projects (Rubin, 2007a).     
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  A little over a year later, Hurricane Betsy made landfall in Florida on September 8 and in 
Louisiana on September 9
th 
(Rubin, 2007a).  Betsy caused seventy-six deaths and was the first 
hurricane to result in at least $1 billion (1965 USD) in damage (Rubin, 2007a).  Once again, 
President Johnson was an engaged “emergency manager”, who not only undertook the 
monitoring of involved federal agencies, but also issued mandates for federal personnel to 
remain in stricken areas to oversee relief operations (Rubin, 2007a).  Congress passed the 
Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act which was “...a temporary measure to provide special 
assistance in areas of the states of Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi which suffered extensive 
property loss and damage from Hurricane Betsy in 1965” (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 1966, para. 3).   
 In August 1969 Hurricane Camille hit the United States.  Camille, a Category 5 storm, 
and the second most intense hurricane ever recorded, resulted in 259 deaths and caused $1.42 
billion (1969 USD, $9.14 billion 2005 USD) worth of damage (National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, 2012).  Windspeeds were estimated to be close to 200 mph and one 
of the lowest barometric pressure readings in the Western Hemisphere was recorded in the eye of 
the storm (U.S. Geological Survey, 1988). Camille was the second of three Category 5 
hurricanes to make landfall in the United States during the 20
th
 century (Blake & Landsea, 2011).  
 The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, whose purpose was to address “normal” 
disasters and not “blockbuster catastrophes” such as the Great Alaska Quake, Betsy and Camille, 
had shortcomings, and new legislation was needed (Rubin, 2007a).   The 1960s saw two new 
pieces of legislation which increased and enhanced the federal government’s role in disaster 
assistance (Rubin, 2007a).  The first piece of legislation was the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 
which “authorized federal agencies to provide loans at below-market rates for as long as forty 
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years, extended aid to unincorporated communities in rural areas, and created a new category of 
eligibility for public colleges and universities damaged by disasters” (Rubin, 2007a, p. 95).  The 
provisions of the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 were broadened by the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 
(Rubin, 2007a). The second piece of legislation was the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) of 
1968 which authorized the federal government to offer property owners flood insurance on the 
condition that local governments pass ordinances restricting development on floodplains (Rubin, 
2007a). The National Flood Insurance Act led to the creation of the National Flood Insurance 
Plan, a program which enabled property owners to purchase flood insurance coverage from the 
federal government (Rubin, 2007a) (Schapley & Schwartz, 2001).   
 Initially limited, the federal government’s role in emergency management was slowly 
expanding with the advent of these acts and the first of many financial “incentives and 
disincentives” appeared with the purpose of encouraging hazard reduction measures at the state 
and local government level (Schapley & Schwartz, 2001).      
 The 1970s 
  Mother Nature continued to flex her muscles in the 1970s.   In February 1971, the San 
Fernando Valley in California was rocked by an earthquake measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale 
(Rubin, 2007a).   Sixty-five people died and over half a billion dollars in damage was caused, 
including extensive damage to dams, freeway interchanges and the damage and destruction of 
two hospitals (Rubin, 2007a).  The San Fernando earthquake is considered to be the “spark” 
which led to the passage of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act (NEHRA) of 1977 
(Birkland, 1997).  In California, the San Fernando quake resulted in the 1972 Alquist-Priolo 
Earthquake Fault Zoning Act (State of California Department of Conservation , 2007).  NEHRA 
created the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP).   The stated purpose of 
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NEHRP is "to reduce the risks of life and property from future earthquakes in the United States 
through the establishment and maintenance of an effective earthquake hazards reduction 
program" (National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, 2009). 
  In June of 1972, Hurricane Agnes made landfall in the Gulf Coast, veered out to the 
Atlantic, gathered strength, returned and traveled up the East Coast, causing severe flooding and 
damaging or destroying over 43,000 structures (Rubin, 2007a).  Agnes resulted in 122 fatalities 
and caused over $2.1 billion in damage (Blake & Landsea, 2011). 
 In 1974, Congress passed The Disaster Relief Act of 1974, establishing the process of 
presidential disaster declarations (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012a). The Act 
expanded federal assistance to state and local governments and provided limited assistance to 
individuals (Waugh, 2000) (Rubin, 2007a).   However, federal involvement in emergency and 
disaster management was scattered among more than 100 agencies, making coordination 
difficult, and overlapping of programs and policies inevitable (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2012a) (Waugh, 2000).   This fragmentation made it difficult to coordinate a federal 
response, and was seen not only as an administrative problem, but also as a political problem.  
More and more, disaster victims blamed the president for slow and ineffective responses and 
results (Waugh, 2000). 
 In 1977, in response to state and local officials’ annoyance with the hodge-podge of 
federal authorities involved with emergency management administration, the Council of State 
Governments and the National Governor’s Association (NGA) commissioned a study on the 
discipline of emergency management (Rubin, 2007a).  The report, among other findings, noted 
the scattering of emergency preparedness and response functions among numerous federal 
agencies and called for a more comprehensive approach to emergency management at both the 
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state and federal levels which would encompass the functions of mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery (Congressional Research Service, 2006) (Rubin, 2007a).   On February 
28, 1978, the NGA adopted a policy position that called for “consolidation of federal emergency 
preparedness and disaster relief responsibilities into one office [to] make the management and 
operation of the federal effort more effective and efficient” (Congressional Research Service, 
2006, p. CRS-13).   
 On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island power plant in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania 
suffered a partial core meltdown which resulted in releasing small amounts of radioactive 
material into the environment (Haddow et al., 2011).  Even though not considered a major 
disaster warranting a presidential disaster declaration, the public warnings and evacuations were 
so badly managed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that President Carter ultimately 
had a number of the Commission’s radiological emergency management duties transferred to 
another agency—the soon-to-be created Federal Emergency Management Agency (Rubin, 
2007a).   
 On April 1, 1979, President Carter, in response to the NGA study, (and perhaps 
convinced by the Three Mile Island accident), established the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), through Executive Order 12127 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2012a) (Rubin, 2007a). FEMA’s goals as the independent federal agency for the national 
emergency management system were to be the point of contact for state and local governments, 
and to address disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery issues and policies 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012a) (Rubin, 2007a) (Waugh, 2000).  Some of the 
agencies absorbed by FEMA included the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire 
Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness 
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Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the 
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2012a). Also transferred to FEMA were civil preparedness programs from 
the Department of Defense (Waugh, 2000).  
The 1980s 
 From the beginning, FEMA had organizational and political problems.  FEMA was 
criticized for giving priority to civil defense–related programs at the expense of the flood 
insurance and natural disaster programs.  Not until the end of the Reagan Administration (1981–
1989), when U.S. – Russian relations improved, were civil defense programs and issues moved 
to the “back-burner” (Sylves, 2008).  In 1985, scandals involving senior agency officials rocked 
FEMA, damaging its reputation.  The director at the time, Louis Giuffrida, and his top aides were 
forced to resign when confronted with a number of charges including “improper awarding of no-
bid contracts, the use of agency funds to build luxurious living quarters for FEMA officials, 
acceptance of gifts by officials from contractors, and questionable payments to contractors” 
(History Commons, 2012, para. 7).  
 In the early 1980’s, FEMA adopted the Integrated Emergency Management System 
(IEMS), the four-phase approach to emergency management envisioned by the NGA (Edwards, 
2007) (Federal Emergency Management Agency,Emergency Management Institute, 2007).  The 
intent of IEMS was to   “create an organizational culture that is critical to achieving unity of 
effort between government, key community partners, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and the private sector” (Federal Emergency Management Agency,Emergency Management 
Institute, 2007, p. 6). 
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 On October 1, 1987, Southern California was rocked by a destructive earthquake with a 
magnitude of 5.9.  The Whittier Narrows earthquake, as it came to be called was the strongest 
quake in the Los Angeles area since the 1971 Sylmar quake.  Freeway support structures were 
damaged, buildings collapsed, eight people died and damage was estimated at about $358 
million (U.S.Geological Survey, 1993b). The quake sharply demonstrated the need for a civilian 
cadre trained in disaster preparedness, and to achieve that goal, the City of Los Angeles created 
the Disaster Preparedness Division, housed within the Los Angeles Fire Department.  Among the 
objectives of disaster preparedness training, research, and distribution of disaster information, 
was the creation of a network of Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).  The year 
before, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), had implemented a pilot CERT program, but, 
due to limited resources, expansion was not possible at that time. After Whittier, it became 
possible, and Los Angeles became “aggressive” about disaster preparedness (CERT Los 
Angeles, 2012b).  
 On November 23, 1988, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2012a).  The Stafford Act, as it is commonly referred to, authorizes the president to 
issue major disaster or emergency declarations, sets broad eligibility criteria, and specifies the 
type of assistance the president may authorize (Sylves, 2008).  “The effects of the Stafford Act 
were so profound for emergency managers that this law came to demarcate the beginning of 
modern-era national disaster management” (Sylves, 2008, p. 60).  
 On October 17, 1989, California once again flexed her muscles, but this time it was the 
San Francisco Bay Area that was rocked by an earthquake measuring 6.9 on the Richter scale.  
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The Loma Prieta Quake was responsible for 63 deaths, 3,757 injuries, and caused an estimated 
$6 billion in property damage (U.S. Geological Survey, 1993a).   
 The year 1989 also saw Hurricane Hugo make landfall on September 22 in South 
Carolina as a Category 4 hurricane, weakening to a Category 1 as it passed over North Carolina.  
In its wake, Hugo left 107 dead, and caused an estimated $7 billion in damage (Blake & 
Landsea, 2011).  In both the Hurricane Hugo and Loma Prieta disasters, FEMA came under 
harsh criticism for poor disaster response (Waugh, 2000).   
The 1990’s 
 Criticism of FEMA continued, reaching a low point after Hurricane Andrew devastated 
Florida in August 1992.  “Thousands of homeless Floridians searched days for food, water and 
help while relief efforts lagged” (Congressional Research Service, 2006, p.CRS-15).  Andrew 
was a Category 5 hurricane, and after barreling through Florida, twenty-six people were dead and 
damages were estimated at $26.5 billion (Blake & Landsea, 2011). Andrew was the third 
costliest hurricane in U.S. history (Blake & Landsea, 2011). Again, criticism of FEMA and then-
President George H.W. Bush was so harsh, speculation is it cost Bush re-election in 1992 
(Sylves, 2008).      
 In 1993, President Clinton appointed James L. Witt as the new FEMA director and the 
department was elevated to ex officio cabinet level status (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, 2012a).  Witt, the first agency director with emergency management experience, 
initiated reforms and reorganizations as suggested by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) 
and the National Performance Review studies (Waugh, 2000).  The agency’s change in focus 
from national security programs to natural and technological disasters, an “all-hazards 
approach,” helped towards the redemption of FEMA’s reputation (Waugh, 2000). Often 
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considered the “golden years” of FEMA, the emphasis was now on mitigation and prevention 
programs, as well as “supporting state and local disaster efforts, building partnerships with state 
and local agencies and the private sector, and increasing public awareness of hazards and 
appropriate self-help measures…”(Waugh, 2000, p. 31). 
 In April of 1992, as authorized by the Stafford Act, the Federal Response Plan (FRP) was 
issued.  The FRP was to coordinate the federal response and resources in a major disaster and 
had proved to be an effective tool in many emergencies and disasters (Sylves, 2008).  Later, in 
response to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the FRP would be replaced by the National Response Plan 
(NRP) in 2004 (Sylves, 2008). 
 In 1993, recognizing the value of the CERT program created and implemented by the 
LAFD, FEMA decided to expand the program nationwide (CERT Los Angeles, 2012b) (Haddow 
et al., 2011).  “The Emergency Management Institute (EMI), in cooperation with the LAFD, 
expanded the CERT materials to make them applicable to all hazards” (CERT Los Angeles, 
2012b, How did CERT start? section, para. 16). 
 The 2000’s  
 
 The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
changed emergency management policy in the United States.  In response to congressional 
advocacy and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) was created through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, combining “all or part of 
twenty-two federal agencies, forty different federal entities and approximately 180,000 
employees” (Sylves, 2008, p. 70).  It was one of the largest federal reorganizations since the 
1947 creation of the Department of Defense, becoming operational in January 2003 (Sylves, 
2008) (Department of Homeland Security, 2012a). At this point, the focus of emergency 
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management went from an “all-hazards” focus, to one focusing on prevention of future terrorist 
attacks (Sylves, 2008).    
 FEMA was absorbed by DHS, thereby losing its ex officio cabinet-level status as well as 
financial and human resources (Sylves, 2008).  Other causalities of the reorganization were state 
and local governments, who, in order to be eligible for federal grant funds and other monies, 
were now expected and mandated to participate in federal anti-terrorism programs (Waugh & 
Tierney, 2007).  “Public policy now demands putting more resources into law enforcement and 
counterterrorism activities and preparedness for other disasters, natural or technological, are 
viewed as less important” (Sylves, 2008, p. 74). 
 Other changes in U.S. disaster policy included creation of the above-mentioned National 
Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Edwards, 2007) 
(Sylves, 2008).   According to FEMA, NIMS “provides a systematic, proactive approach to 
guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and 
the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and 
mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to 
reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency , 2012d, p. 1).  
 Contained within NIMS, are the Incident Command System (ICS), which forms the field-
level basis for NIMS, and the Multi-agency Coordination System (MACS) (Edwards, 2007) 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012d).   Originally developed in California in the 
1970s after a series of wildland fires, ICS is a “widely applicable management system designed 
to enable effective, efficient incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common 
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organizational structure” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012d, p. 45).  MACS is a 
process that “supports interagency cooperation in an event involving several jurisdictions or 
levels of government” (Edwards, 2007, p. 35).     
  Another change enacted after 9/11, was the creation of Citizen Corps, a program whose 
objective is to “help coordinate volunteer activities” with a “public safety, preparedness and 
response” focus (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012c, para. 4). FEMA is the 
national coordinator for the program, and in 2002 CERT became part of the Citizen Corps 
Program (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012 g) (Haddow et al., 2011). As hoped 
for, the CERT concept and program has spread, and as of November 2011, there were over 1100 
CERT programs nationwide (Citizen Corps. 2012b). 
 The National Response Plan was put to the test in August of 2005 when Hurricane 
Katrina made landfall in the Gulf Coast states.  Katrina, the deadliest and most destructive 
hurricane in 2005, (Hurricane Rita in September 2005 also caused extensive damage and 
destruction), was also one of the costliest.  Responsible for at least 1,200 deaths, and an 
estimated $108 billion in property damage, Katrina, easily surpassed the damage done by 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Blake & Landsea, 2011).  When Katrina was through, nearly 80% of 
New Orleans was flooded (Haddow et al., 2011). 
 The other disaster of 2005 was the response from federal, state and local agencies to 
Katrina. “In fact, the poor response to Katrina was eerily similar to the poor response to Andrew 
in 1992” (Waugh & Tierney, 2007, p.325).  So loud and vociferous were the criticisms of 
mismanagement and lack of leadership that FEMA director Michael Brown was forced to resign 
(Sylves, 2008). Criticism was also leveled at Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New 
Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin (Haddow et al., 2011). Government after-action reports called the 
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response a failure, “and the recovery phase is considered to show the same level of 
incompetence” (Haddow et al., 2011, p. 19).  
 The storm’s destruction prompted a Congressional investigation that found all three 
levels of government were at fault, and also “…found that FEMA and the Red Cross did not 
have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf coast 
victims” (U.S.House of Representatives, 2006, p.343). “Hurricane Katrina and the excoriated 
federal response to that disaster moved Congress to reconstitute FEMA as a full-service 
emergency management agency, but one still embedded within the gigantic Department of 
Homeland Security” (Sylves, 2008, p. 85). 
 In response to Katrina, the 109th Congress (2005-2007), enacted six statues containing 
changes that would affect future federal responses, among which was the Post-Katrina 
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Congressional Research Service, 2007).  The 
Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2006.  
The Act reorganized FEMA, providing, among other things, a more direct line of access to the 
president (Federal Emergency Management Agency , 2012a).  The Act also sought to “more 
effectively coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts” along with 
recognizing that “improved capabilities were needed for catastrophic disasters--particularly in 
the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) 
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care and sheltering” (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007, para. 2).  
 FEMA today remains within DHS, with Craig Fugate, a former state director of 
emergency management in Florida, as the current FEMA administrator.  One of Fugate’s stated 
goals is to “make a culture of preparedness-especially personal preparedness-a hallmark of his 
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FEMA tenure” (Haddow et al., 2011, p. 23).  Several veterans of emergency management from 
the Witt years of the 1990s have joined Fugate’s team, and he “strongly supports rebuilding the 
partnership with state and local emergency management organizations” (Haddow et al., 2011, p. 
23).   
 Over the years, emergency management has gone from a civil defense focus, to an all-
hazards focus, to a terrorism-focused approach, and now, once again back to an all-hazards 
approach.  State and local government have a constitutional obligation to provide for the public’s 
health and safety, but, as illustrated time after time, in a major disaster or emergency, resources 
may not be available to provide the general public with the usual and expected level of service.  
In fact, if the event is serious enough, there may be no service for days (Haddow et al., 2011).  
To that end, communities, such as the cities within the County of Santa Clara, need to look for 
options to reduce vulnerability and increase preparedness.  One such option is local participation 
in CERT programs.  
 
Literature Review 
  In February of 2010, the County of Santa Clara began developing an annex to the 2010 
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan, Taming Natural 
Disasters.  The County’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) led the effort, and was joined by 
thirteen of the fifteen incorporated cities in the County, (Milpitas and Los Altos Hills did not 
participate), along with several private sector businesses. The goal of the project “was to identify 
mitigation priorities and actions shared across jurisdiction borders” (County of Santa Clara, 
2011a, p. 1-1).  As part of the Plan development process, in November 2010, the Local Planning 
Team (LPT) used an online survey to “request public input regarding concern for hazard risk” 
(County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p. 3-19) (Appendix A).   The survey was available to members of the 
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public who work and/or live within Santa Clara County, and was accessible online through January 
15, 2011.  Results of the survey would also be used to gauge the public’s emergency preparedness 
levels.  Question 6 of the survey specifically targeted CERT, and asked respondents about their 
CERT involvement.  It is these results that provide the data utilized in the Findings and Analysis 
of this paper.     
 Yet, CERT teams were not always part of the emergency preparedness landscape, nor 
was there always an “emergency management system.”  In Living with Hazards, Dealing with 
Disasters William Waugh describes the evolution of emergency management in the United 
States from the earliest days of federal government involvement, to the Cold War era, to the 
“Golden Days” of FEMA under James Lee Witt, to FEMA after Witt (Waugh, 2000).  This book 
was published pre-9-11, and presents a look at emergency management that seems almost 
simplistic when compared to the more complex system of today. Waugh also presents a 
perspective on the obstacles to effective emergency management systems which are easily 
translatable to an analysis of challenges facing the success and sustainability of CERT programs 
at the local government level.  Issues discussed as obstacles to effective emergency management 
systems include lack of political support, public apathy, and fiscal administration (Waugh, 2000).  
 Local governments, faced with obstacles such as those described above, must also 
constantly provide justification for programs which at times may seem unnecessary to some 
municipal leaders.  This was never truer than during this country’s latest economic downturn.  
Evaluating an effective emergency management program can prove tricky because an effective 
program is a system comprised of many elements which are interconnected.  An article in Public 
Administration Review proposes a framework for emergency managers and municipal leaders to 
use in evaluating their emergency management programs.  The author, after completing an 
extensive review of expert literature on the subject of emergency management, has distilled the 
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commonly agreed-upon points of “best practices”, and created an evaluation with thirty elements 
(Henstra, March/April 2010).  Henstra considers CERT to be one of the tools for a high-quality 
emergency management program and includes the program as a part of his proposed evaluation.  
This article builds on the perspective provided by the LHMP survey with regards to the value of 
CERT in a local emergency management program. 
 In 2006, the Little Hoover Commission conducted a study on California’s state of 
emergency preparedness and found it lacking (State of California Little Hoover Commission, 
2006).  The study found that shortfalls in the State’s emergency management system, if not 
addressed and corrected, will compromise the health and welfare of California residents in a 
major disaster or emergency.  The Commission’s report details the State’s shortfalls and/or 
inconsistencies, and provides recommendations for improvement.  Among the many 
recommendations are calls for increasing community and volunteer involvement in emergency 
preparedness.  According to the report, California has approximately 33,000 trained CERT 
members (State of California Little Hoover Commission, 2006).  Furthermore, the report 
contains the text of Governor’s Executive Order S-04-06, ordering that the strengthening of 
disaster preparedness in the State is to include increasing public awareness campaigns such as 
“Be Smart, Be Prepared, and Be Responsible”  along with increasing coordination of volunteer 
activities (State of California Little Hoover Commission, 2006).    
 Faced with a daunting task, CalEMA,(California Emergency Management Agency), in its 
2010-2015 Strategic Plan, describes the department’s goals and objectives for increasing 
“California’s ability to mitigate, plan, and prepare for disasters, emergencies, and terrorist events” 
and “effectively respond to and quickly recover from both intentional and natural disasters” 
(CalEMA, 2010, p. 2).   The report demonstrates the State’s commitment to and recognition of 
the importance of a public that is prepared and educated with regards to hazards facing 
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California.  Objective 2.3 of the report speaks directly to increasing citizen preparedness, which 
helps to provide a context for the involvement and importance of local CERT teams in the 
State’s overall emergency preparedness level (CalEMA, 2010). 
 In Chapter One of Emergency Management, Principles and Practice for Local 
Government, William Waugh discussed how after  9-11, emergency management focus changed 
from natural and technological hazards to terrorism, and then changed back to an all hazards 
focus after Hurricane Katrina (Waugh, 2007).  After the 2001 terrorist attacks, emergency 
management went from preparing for the next natural or technological disaster, to a world where 
the focus now became the “war on terror” (Waugh, 2007).   The focus again shifted after 
Hurricane Katrina, reverting to some extent back to an all-hazards approach.  Waugh (2007) 
touches on the concerns of municipal leaders and emergency managers at the still low-level of 
the public’s emergency preparedness, which persists even after having endured and witnessed  a 
catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina.  The author also provides a look at the changing role of the 
government in disaster response and recovery as it evolves out of the “cavalry” role, and 
attempts to move the general public in the direction of having to assume greater responsibilty for 
their own health, safety and welfare in the context of a disaster (Waugh, 2007).    
 While complementing previously mentioned sources used to trace the history and 
development of emergency management, Rubin provides an interesting local context by drawing 
parallels between the responses to the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake response and Hurricane 
Katrina (Rubin, 2007b).  She provides examples such as denial of risks, partisan politics, 
political influences on land use planning, and the necessity of utilizing the military for disaster 
relief, which paint a sobering and frightening picture for anyone concerned about a future, and 
almost inevitable, catastrophic earthquake in California (Rubin, 2007b).  Additionally, like 
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Waugh, Rubin also points out the general public’s sense of entitlement that continues when it 
comes to government aid and response—a direct contrast to government’s goal of shedding its 
role as the cavalry (Rubin 2007a).  As Los Angeles CERT states so succinctly in its marketing 
brochure:  “It is important to know, if a major disaster occurs, the LAFD, paramedics, 
police...WILL NOT COME!” (CERT Los Angeles, 2012a).     
 Edwards and Goodrich describe emergency management as a multi-faceted, multi-level 
system consisting of many layers of people and organizations, where the overarching goal of all 
involved is to “create and sustain a disaster-resilient community” (Edwards and Goodrich, 2007, 
p. 53). Notwithstanding the many layers and levels, it still comes down to the local level.  Local 
control, local needs, and local response are the foundation of the local government emergency 
management program, which includes optimal utilization of local assets such as community 
volunteers.  Examples such as the volunteer response to the Loma Prieta-induced1989 Cypress 
Structure collapse emphasize not only the role of local volunteers in disaster response, but the 
role and need for trained volunteers, such as CERT members (Edwards and Goodrich, 2007).  
Haddow, in his book, Introduction to Emergency Management, also echoes the oft-expressed 
theme of trained volunteer organizations and personnel (Haddow et al., 2011).   
  James Lee Witt has been quoted as saying that “All disasters are local,” (Edwards and 
Goodrich, 2012), and nothing in recent history illustrates that principle as stunningly as the 
Hurricane Katrina response, or rather the failures of the response as reported by the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in their report on Hurricane 
Katrina, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, 2006).  The report concluded that the disaster response was a 
failure, and all levels of government were culpable (Senate Committee on Homeland Security 
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and Governmental Affairs, 2006).  Local government’s late notice to evacuate and failure to 
adequately notify residents of transportation alternatives left twenty percent of New Orleans’ 
population in harm’s way (Edward and Steinhausler, 2007).  The multi-layered federal system of 
disaster response failed in its initial estimate of damage and need in New Orleans, leaving 
thousands to fend for themselves in the flooded city.  Local first responders, who were also 
victims of the flooding and loss of communications, were overwhelmed then, and will be again 
in the next disaster.   
 FEMA’s approach to emergency management continues to evolve, and in December 
2011, FEMA published a report, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management:  
Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011).  
The report is the culmination of eighteen months of dialogue between FEMA and “many of its 
emergency management partners – including local, tribal, state, territorial, and Federal 
representatives; academia; nongovernmental organizations; community members; and the private 
sector” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012e, Principles section, para. 1).  FEMA 
defines Whole Community as, “A means by which residents, emergency management practitioners, 
organizational and community leaders, and government officials can collectively understand and 
assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and 
strengthen their assets, capacities, and interests” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011 
p. 3). 
Three principles emerged from the national dialogue which represents the foundation of the Whole 
Community approach: 
 “Understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community. 
 
 Engage and empower all parts of the community. 
 
 Strengthen what works well in communities on a daily basis” (p. 4-5).  
25 
 
  
 Additionally, six strategic themes were identified during the national dialogue which directly 
address avenues for effective implementation of the principles 
 “Understand community complexity. 
 Recognize community capabilities and needs. 
 Foster relationships with community leaders. 
 Build and maintain partnerships. 
 Empower local action. 
 Leverage and strengthen social infrastructure, networks, and assets” (p. 5). 
 In the report’s “Pathways for Action” section, (p. 19-22) many suggestions and 
recommendations are provided for communities, government agencies and organizations as they 
seek to establish or improve their current emergency management operations, and the report does 
stress that the Whole Community approach is not a one size fits all solution.  Programs and 
outreach efforts need to be tailored to each individual community.  When considering 
community participation in programs such as CERT, how will officials be able to recognize and 
surmount barriers to participation without first knowing the demographics of their community?  
If a segment of the population is struggling not only with the language, but is also struggling to 
put food on the table, the chances of that particular population being aware of, much less 
enrolling in, a CERT course for $35 is non-existent. Officials must find ways to work within the 
realities of their community and its residents.  The population considered economically 
disadvantaged in Santa Clara County is going to be different from the economically 
disadvantaged in Bullock County, Alabama. Other avenues for communication and involvement 
have to be instituted, and as outlined in the principles and themes, Whole Community is effective 
when the “whole community” is engaged and involved. 
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 Assessing the poor and vulnerable population’s level of emergency preparedness is the 
subject of the scholarly article titled, “The Relationship between Socio-economic Conditions and 
the Impact of Natural Disasters on Rural and Urbanized Regions’ Levels of Preparedness and 
Recovery” by Burney, Simmonds and Queeley (2007) in Forum on Public Policy.  Their 
research determined that “poverty is the central factor that will determine the level of 
vulnerability and hence the survival of a natural hazard turned disaster” (Burney, Simmonds, & 
Queeley, 2007, p. 1).  The poor, with limited resources and information, are impacted the most in 
natural and created disasters, as was seen following Hurricane Katrina:  the survivors who 
became homeless were mostly poor (Burney, Simmonds, & Queeley, 2007).  The upper and 
middle classes generally have more resources to assist them in evacuation, recovery and 
rebuilding after a disaster.  As a measure of poverty, transportation is key, as impoverished 
families either have no personal transportation or are at the mercy of public transportation, 
which, as was seen in the Katrina aftermath, can be catastrophic in its failure to provide a means 
to evacuate.   
 One of the instruments used in the Burney, Simmonds, & Queeley study was the 
Evacuation and Reunification Readiness Scale (ERRS).  The ERRS was designed for this 
specific study, and measures “levels of knowledge and actual preparedness, evacuation, and 
reunification of children and families ages 12 to over 65 years” (Burney, et al.,2007, p. 9).  
Participants in the study were from Florida, and the Northern and Southern United States.  In 
evaluating the overall level of preparedness, many critical areas were found deficient among the 
respondents, such as no knowledge of their city’s evacuation plans, lack of property insurance 
and lack of disaster preparedness kits.  When considering the most basic human needs of food 
and water, 67% of respondents answered “No” or “don’t know” when asked if their city would 
27 
 
provide potable water in a disaster;  59% of respondents answered “No” or “don’t know” when 
asked if their city provided essential food (Burney, et al.,2007).  Burney, et.al. (2007) concluded 
that the impoverished find it difficult to not only engage in emergency preparedness, but also 
experience increased levels of difficulty in the recovery aftermath.  Additionally, the authors 
echoed the sentiments expressed in FEMA’s Whole Community approach, particularly the first 
principle, to “Understand and meet the actual needs of the whole community” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2011, p.4).  Government officials and policy makers, by knowing the 
demographics of their community, can effectively use that information when constructing disaster 
preparedness plans and policies.    
 Another scholarly article that examined emergency preparedness was “Factors Predicting 
Individual Emergency Preparedness:  A Multi-State Analysis of 2006 BRFSS Data” by Ablah, 
Konda and Kelley (2009) in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and 
Science.  Using data from the 2006 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), the 
authors attempted to identify the factors that are “most likely to predict individual disaster 
preparedness” (Ablah, Konda, & Kelley, 2009, p. 317).  The BRFSS questionnaire contained an 11-
item general preparedness section, with six of the items actionable steps the respondent would need 
to meet the definition of “preparedeness” as defined by this specific study.  Respondents were 
considered “prepared” if they had completed five out of the six steps.  Results showed a disconnect 
between the respondents’ perception of their level of preparedness, and their actual level of 
preparedness as measured by the BRFSS.  Of the respondents, 78% felt they were prepared, but the 
BRFSS measurement indicated only 45% were actually prepared (Ablah, et al., 2009).  Factors found 
to affect preparedness were income, age and ability to afford medical care, with income and age the 
most significant predictors.  Respondents 55 years of age and older, and those reporting incomes 
greater than $50,000, were found to be more likely to be prepared.  Less likely to be prepared were 
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those respondents who had  trouble affording medical care, “those with less than a high school 
education…and those with children in the home…” (Ablah, et al., 2009, p. 321).  The study by 
Ablah, et al.(2009) agrees with the study conducted by  Burney, et.al. (2007) in that vulnerable 
populations such as the economically disadvantaged are more at risk in a disaster, and are less 
likely to engage in emergency and disaster preparedness actions.    
 Included in the vulnerable population category are older adults, a sometimes overlooked 
segment of the population. In “Emergency Preparedness and Response:  Health and Social Policy 
Implications for Older Adults,” Elmore and Brown (2008), reinforce the points made by Ablah, 
et al. (2009) and Burney, et al. (2007) in that the vulnerable and at risk populations are less likely 
to engage in emergency preparedness, whether through lack of ability, information or resources, 
and therefore, more concentrated efforts are required by local officials and the community to not 
only engage these people, but also to identify them.  An interesting point made by Elmore and 
Brown (2008) is that while many older adults particpate in service and support organizations, 
there is a segment of the older population who are not associated or involved with these 
organizations—identifying these people is essential, as, unless they and their special needs (such 
as lack of transportation) are recognized, they are potential victims in the next disaster.  
Simerman, et al. noted that  74 % of Hurricane Katrina-related deaths  were age 60 and older (as 
cited in Elmore and Brown, 2008, p. 66).    
 The average citizen cannot control the when and where of the next disaster, but can, to 
some extent, control his own preparedness and response.  To that end, community involvement 
in a CERT program provides the general public with an option for surviving the next “Big One.”  
Although there are many elements to community-level disaster preparedness, training 
community members in CERT is one proven mechanism for mobilizing the population for self-
help.  However, community leaders need to recognize that not all segments of the population are 
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able to engage in or capable of achieving self-help.  Engaging the most vulnerable requires more 
effort, more work and “takes a lot of meetings and nurturing of collective decision-making” 
(J.Col, personal communication November 17, 2012). Sadly, the population which would most 
benefit from being prepared is oftentimes the population least likely to be prepared.   
 
Problem Statement 
  
 California has the potential to produce catastrophic natural disasters, namely fires, floods 
and earthquakes.  These disasters have happened in the past and can be expected to happen in the 
future.  In a disaster, the public expects an effective government response; however, the 
immediate needs of individuals may initially go unmet in a major disaster.  One method of 
preparing and educating citizens for meeting these immediate needs is through citizen 
participation in Community Emergency Preparedness Teams (CERT).  However, scholars have 
suggested that the impoverished find it difficult to engage in meaningful personal emergency 
preparedness.  Therefore, by teaching the middle and upper class members of a community to 
become self-sufficient, a community makes an investment that will permit more post-disaster 
resources to be directed toward the special needs and impoverished community members.  This 
research examined the level of emergency preparedness of Santa Clara County cities with 
regards to their participation in a CERT program, along with attempting to ascertain what factors 
appear to be predictors of CERT participation or non-participation and the potential objective 
and subjective implications for a community with enhanced CERT participation.  
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Methodology 
 This paper utilizes the Managerial Audit principle as defined by Ronald and Kathleen 
Sylvia.  A managerial audit analyzes and assesses the capabilities of a company’s, (in this case, a 
city’s) management method as a whole in order to evaluate their effectiveness with regards to the 
objectives (goals) of a program or procedure, in this case the CERT program (Sylvia and Sylvia, 
2004).  A managerial audit does not measure compliance, but rather may challenge the “status 
quo” with an eye toward improving efficiency (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004).  This audit will 
evaluate each city’s CERT participation as a percentage of population in relation to the other 
cities participation.  The goal of the CERT program is to improve community preparedness by 
training volunteer citizen teams in basic life safety and emergency preparedness skills in order to 
be able to assist their municipality or organization in the event of a major incident or large scale 
disaster (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012b).   Utilizing CERT data obtained from 
the County’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) 
survey, combined with data assembled from the cities’ responses to inquiries regarding their 
CERT programs, this research analyzed and examined the data to see if there are quantifiable 
factors which are predictors of CERT participation in Santa Clara County, and what factors, if 
any, enhance or detract from CERT participation. 
 
Findings 
 
 In February of 2010, the County of Santa Clara began developing an annex to the 2010 
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan, Taming Natural 
Disasters. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 requires local governments to have a FEMA-
approved hazard mitigation plan in order to be eligible for FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation and 
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Hazard Mitigation Grant program (County of Santa Clara, 2011a).  The County’s Office of 
Emergency Services (OES) lead the effort, and was joined by 13 of the 15 incorporated cities in 
the County, (Milpitas and Los Altos Hills did not participate), along with several private sector 
businesses. The goal of this project “was to identify mitigation priorities and actions shared 
across jurisdiction borders” (County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p. 1-1). Among its many purposes 
the Plan’s intent was to:    
 “Enhance Public Awareness and Understanding  
 Create a Decision Tool for Management  
 Promote Compliance with State and Federal Program Requirements  
 Enhance Local Policies for Hazard Mitigation Capability  
 Provide Inter-Jurisdictional Coordination of Mitigation-Related Programming  
 Achieve Regulatory Compliance” (County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p.2-1). 
 
 
 As part of the Plan development process, in November 2010, the Local Planning Team 
(LPT) used an online survey to “solicit public input regarding concern for hazard risk” (County 
of Santa Clara, 2011a, p.3-19). The survey was designed by the consulting firm Dewberry in 
Roseville, California.  Dewberry is headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia, and in addition to offering 
consultant services in emergency management, disaster and mitigation services, also offers 
engineering and architectural consulting services.  For the past decade, Dewberry has been 
assisting and supporting local and state governments to meet the hazard mitigation plan 
requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Dewberry, 2012).  In constructing a local 
hazard mitigation plan, FEMA requires the agencies, in this case the local governments, to 
provide the general public with opportunities for public input and comment (County of Santa 
Clara, 2011a). The on-line survey provided one of these opportunities.  The survey design and 
questions are typical of hazard mitigation plan surveys Dewberry has designed and administered 
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over the years (Dewberry, 2012).  However, the survey’s response validity was not tested 
(County of Santa Clara, 2011a).           
 The survey was available on-line through January 15, 2011, and was available to 
members of the public who work and/or live within Santa Clara County.  While Dewberry provided 
the participating cities with advice on how to inform and solicit public input, it was left to the 
individual cities as to how to inform the public of their opportunity for input (County of Santa 
Clara, 2011a).  Local Planning Team members were encouraged to forward the survey to their 
friends and family who either resided or worked in Santa Clara County.  Participating cities were 
encouraged to “provide a link to this survey on your city website, issue a press release, and send 
an email distribution to local stakeholders, non‐profit organizations, volunteer organizations, 
schools, homeowners associations, CERT members, hospital organizations” (County of Santa 
Clara, 2011a, p.449).  Some cities, such as Campbell, notified residents and businesses of the 
survey through their local government access TV station and through the Campbell Profile 
publication, the city’s official newsletter published three times a year and mailed to all residents in 
the City’s Recreation and Activity Guide (City of Campbell Annex, 2012).  Other cities, such as 
Sunnyvale, notified residents and businesses via the City’s website, along with notifying by email 
neighborhood associations, SNAP (Sunnyvale’s CERT program) and SARES (Sunnyvale’s 
Amateur Radio Emergency Services) members (City of Sunnyvale Annex, 2012).  Results of the 
survey would also be used by the Local Planning Team to gauge the public’s emergency 
preparedness levels (County of Santa Clara, 2011a).    
 By January 17, 2011, the County had received 541 responses, out of over 1.7 million 
residents.  While this response is not statistically significant it is an interesting reflection of 
community interest in and involvement in emergency preparedness. Table 1 summarizes the total 
number of respondents by city to the 2010 Santa Clara County Hazard Mitigation Plan Survey: 
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Table 1:  Total Number of Respondents by City: 
 
City or Jurisdiction 
 
Population from 
2010 Census 
Number of  
Respondents 
Campbell 39,968 21 
Cupertino 59,220 25 
Gilroy 48,821 16 
Los Altos 29,431 13 
Los Altos Hills 7,922 2 
Los Gatos 29,424 21 
Milpitas 66,790 5 
Monte Sereno 3,341 25 
Morgan Hill 37,882 13 
Mountain View 74,066 21 
Palo Alto 65,412 50 
San Jose 952,612 144 
Santa Clara 116,468 24 
Saratoga 30,401 28 
Sunnyvale 142,287 108 
Santa Clara County Unincorporated  25 
 
Total 1,781,642 541 
 Source of data:   County of Santa Clara, 2011a, and US Census, 2010 
 
 The survey contained twenty-two questions, and asked participants for responses on 
topics such as demographics, emergency preparedness; hazard and risk awareness, and personal 
mitigation efforts such as flood and earthquake insurance.  Specifically targeting CERT, 
Question 6 of the survey asked, “Are you a trained member of your Community Emergency 
Response Team (CERT)?  (Note: your community may use a different name than CERT such as 
SNAP, PANDA, San Jose Prepared, HEAT, SAFE, etc)” (County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p. 442).  
Possible responses were: Yes; No, I would like to learn more about CERT; and No, I am not 
interested in being a trained CERT member (County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p. 442).  
 The majority of the respondents, slightly over 40%, responded that they were part of 
CERT.  A little less than one-fourth of respondents answered that they were not part of a CERT 
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program, but would like to learn more about the program.  Somewhat surprisingly, over one-
third of respondents answered that they were not part of CERT and were not interested in the 
program—refer to Table 2 below.    
Table 2:  Countywide response to Question 6    
 
Yes,  
I am a part of CERT 
No,  
I am not a part of CERT, but 
would like to learn more 
No,  
I am not interested in CERT 
214 (40.3%) 
 
130 (24.5%) 
 
187 (35.2%) 
 
Source:  County of Santa Clara, 2011a 
 
 For a breakdown of responses to Question 6 by city refer to Table 3, below, which takes 
each city’s total number of responses as listed in Table 1 above and sorts them by type of 
response.  
Table 3:  Responses to Question 6 by city: 
 
 
City/Jurisdiction 
 
Total # of 
responses 
 
Yes, I am a part of 
CERT 
 
No, I am not a part of 
CERT but would like 
to learn more 
 
 
No, I am not interested 
in being a CERT 
member 
 Total # % # % # % 
        
Campbell1 21 2 (10%) 5 (25%) 13 (65%) 
Cupertino 25 14 (56%) 5 (20%) 6 (24%) 
Gilroy 16 4 (25%) 7 (43.8%) 5 (31.3%) 
Los Altos 13 7 (53.8%) 6 (46.2%) 0 0 
Los Gatos 21 7 (33.3%) 12 (57.1%) 2 (9.5%) 
Monte Sereno 25 3 (12.5%) 11 (45.8%) 10 (41.7%) 
Morgan Hill 13 3 (23.1%) 4 (30.8%) 6 (46.2%) 
Mountain View 21 10 (47.6%) 2 (9.5%) 9 (42.9%) 
Palo Alto2 50 35 (71.4%) 2 (4.1%) 12 (24.5%) 
San Jose 144 17 (12%) 45 (31.7%) 80 (56.3%) 
Santa Clara 24 3 (12.5%) 7 (29.2%) 14 (58.3%) 
Saratoga3 28 16 (61.5%) 3 (11.5%) 7 (26.9%) 
Sunnyvale 108 79 (75.2%) 14 (13.3%) 12 (11.4%) 
1One respondent skipped this question, 2One respondent skipped this question 3Two respondents skipped this 
question 
Source of the data:  County of Santa Clara, 2011a   
 Table 4, below, illustrates the percentages of “yes” responses ranging from a low of 10% 
to a high of 75.2%.  Palo Alto and Sunnyvale had the highest percentage of “yes” responses, with 
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71.4% and 75.2%, respectively.  The cities with the lowest percentage of “yes” responses were 
Campbell and San Jose, with 10% and 12%, respectively.    
Table 4:  “Yes” answers as a percentage of city’s total survey responses 
 
Cities sorted by highest to lowest percentage 
of respondents answering "Yes, I am a member of 
CERT 
 
CITY Yes, I am a member of 
CERT 
Sunnyvale 75.2% 
Palo Alto 71.4% 
Saratoga 61.5% 
Cupertino 56% 
Los Altos 53.8% 
Mountain View 47.6% 
Los Gatos 33.3% 
Gilroy 25% 
Morgan Hill 23.1% 
Santa Clara 12.5% 
Monte Sereno 12.5% 
San Jose 12% 
Campbell 10% 
   Source of the data: County of Santa Clara, 2011 
 
 With reference to Table 5, below, the percentages of “No, I am not a member of CERT 
but am interested” responses ranged from a low of 4.10% to a high of 57.1%.  Los Gatos and Los 
Altos had the highest percentage of “interested” responses, with 57.1% and 46.2%, respectively.  
The cities with the lowest percentage of “interested” responses were Mountain View and Palo 
Alto, with 9.5% and 4.1% respectively. 
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Table 5:  “No, I am not a member of CERT but I am interested” answers as a percentage of 
      city’s total survey responses 
 
Cities sorted by highest to lowest percentage of 
respondents answering “No, I would like to 
learn more about CERT." 
 
CITY No, not CERT member, 
but interested. 
Los Gatos 57.1% 
Los Altos 46.2% 
Monte Sereno 45.8% 
Gilroy 43.8% 
San Jose 31.7% 
Morgan Hill 30.8% 
Santa Clara 29.2% 
Campbell 25% 
Cupertino 20% 
Sunnyvale 13.3% 
Saratoga 11.5% 
Mountain View 9.5% 
Palo Alto 4.1% 
                        Source of the data: County of Santa Clara, 2011 
 
 
 The percentages of “No, I am not interested in being a CERT member” ranged from a 
high of 65% to a low of 0%.  Refer to Table 6, below.  Campbell and Santa Clara had the highest 
percentage of “not interested” responses with 65% and 58.3%, respectively.  Los Gatos and Los 
Altos had the lowest percentage of “not interested” responses, with 9.5% for Los Gatos, and 0 
responses from Los Altos indicating no interest in CERT.   
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Table 6:  “No I am not interested in being a CERT member” answers as a percentage of  
     city’s total survey responses 
  
 
Cities sorted by highest to lowest percentage of 
respondents answering "No, I am not interested in 
being a CERT member.” 
 
CITY Not interested in being 
a CERT member 
Campbell 65% 
Santa Clara 58.3% 
San Jose 56.3% 
Morgan Hill 46.2% 
Mountain View 42.9% 
Monte Sereno 41.7% 
Gilroy 31.3% 
Saratoga 26.9% 
Palo Alto 24.5% 
Cupertino 24% 
Sunnyvale 11.4% 
Los Gatos 9.5% 
Los Altos 0 
   Source of the data: County of Santa Clara, 2011a  
 While the data from the survey appears to provide a proxy for interest in CERT 
membership in the cities, the very low response compared with the actual community population 
means that the responses are not statistically significant. Therefore, in an attempt to find actual 
city CERT membership, a city by city examination of current CERT programs and membership 
was conducted and documented in Table 7, below.  Each city was contacted via email and 
telephone for information regarding their CERT programs.  The contacts at the cities were asked 
for the number of current, active CERT members; year the program started in their city; cost to 
participate; and how/if the city maintains contact with program graduates.   
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Table 7:  CERT Programs in Santa Clara County by City 
 
CERT Programs in Santa Clara County by City 
City 
 
Name of CERT 
program; Year 
program started 
( ) 
2012 Active CERT 
membership 
Cost to participate Population Comments 
Campbell Campbell 
CERT 
(2012) 
40 $35.00 39,968 Training is through Santa 
Clara County Fire.  Original 
CERT program ran 2002-
2006.  Discontinued due to 
staff reductions.  
Cupertino Cupertino 
CERT 
(1991) 
Over 1,000 
trained; 50-100 
Active (est.) 
Free for 
residents 
59,220 Training is through Santa 
Clara County Fire.   
  
Gilroy Gilroy CERT 
(2010) 
50 Free for 
residents 
48,821 Members are considered 
active if they have attended at 
least 3 of the 12 most recent 
monthly training meetings. 
Los Altos Not Available    29,431  
Los Altos 
Hills 
LAHCFD 
CERT 
(2008) 
180 Free for 
residents 
7,922 Training is through Santa 
Clara County Fire 
Los Gatos CERT 
(2003) 
222 $35.00 29,424  
Milpitas S.A.F.E. 
(2001) 
500-600 Trained; 
250 Active (est.) 
Free for 
residents 
66,790 SAFE=Strategic Actions for 
Emergencies 
Monte Sereno Monte Sereno 
CERT 
(2003) 
28 $35.00 3,341  
Morgan Hill Morgan Hill 
CERT 
(2003) 
200 Trained; 45 
Active 
Free for 
residents 
37,882  
Mountain 
View 
CERT 
(2001) 
914 Free for 
residents 
74,066 Prior to adoption of FEMA 
CERT curriculum, city had a 
Neighborhood Disaster 
Preparedness program, 1995-
2001     
Palo Alto PANDA 
Not Available 
  65,412  
San Jose San Jose 
Prepared! 
(1994) 
Over 5,000 
Trained; 1,424 
Active 
$50.00 952,612 Prior to adoption of CERT 
curriculum, cit had an 
Emergency Preparedness 
program 1986-1994 
Santa Clara HEAT 
(1995) 
741 Trained;  20-
50 Active (est.) 
$25/student; 
$40/couple 
116,468 HEAT=Home Emergency 
Assistance Team 
Saratoga Saratoga 
CERT 
(2006) 
50 $35.00 
 
30,401 Training is through Santa 
Clara County Fire 
Sunnyvale SNAP 
(1986) 
Over 1,000 
trained; 250 active 
$15.00 Training 
provided at no cost 
to residents.  
Charge is for the 
Red Cross Basic 
First Aid & Adult 
CPR course. 
142,287 SNAP= Sunnyvale Neighbors 
Actively Prepare 
 
Sources of Information:  City of Campbell What’s New!; City of Cupertino CERT; City of Cupertino Adopted Budget 2012-13; Edwards, 2012; 
City of Gilroy CERT; City of Los Altos Hills; Los Gatos/Monte Sereno Police Department Community Outreach Coordinator; City of Milpitas; 
City of Morgan Hill; Mountain View Fire Department; City of San Jose; City of Santa Clara; City of Saratoga CERT; City of Sunnyvale 
Emergency Preparedness; US Census Bureau  
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 Table 8 illustrates the number of CERT memberships as suggested by the responses to 
the “yes” question in relation to each city’s population over the age of 18.  (According to the 
CERT/Citizen Corps website, the minimum suggested age for participation is 18).   
 Table 8:  Theoretical number of CERT members as suggested by the percentage of LHMP  
      survey Question #6 respondents.  
 
City % of “Yes” 
respondents’ 
City 
population 
over 18 
Theoretical # 
of CERT 
members 
Reported 
active CERT 
members 
Difference 
Campbell (10%) 31,078 3,107 10 3,097 
Cupertino (56%) 42,227 23,647 50-100 (est.) 23,597-
23,547 
Gilroy (25%) 33,838 8,460 50 8,410 
Los Altos (53.8%) 21,416 11,521 Not Available  
Los Gatos (33.3%) 22,846 7,607 222 7,385 
Monte Sereno (12.5%) 2,525 315 28 287 
Morgan Hill (23.1%) 27,044 6,247 45 6,202 
Mountain View (47.6%) 59,471 28,308 914 27,394 
Palo Alto (71.4%) 49,324 35,217 50 35,167 
San Jose (12%) 711,264 85,351 1,424 83,927 
Santa Clara (12.5%) 91,694 11,461 20-50 (est.) 11,441-
11,411 
Saratoga (61.5%) 22,753 13,993 50 13,943 
Sunnyvale (75.2%) 108,646 81,701 250 81,451 
Sources:  US Census Bureau, American FactFinder  
 None of the cities reported CERT membership numbers consistent with or equal to the 
CERT memberships as suggested by the percentage of “yes” responses, therefore, no correlation 
between the responses to the CERT Question (Questions #6) of the Local Hazard Mitigation 
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Plan’s public survey and actual CERT membership was found. This is due to the low number of 
responses in each city, and the minimal outreach that was conducted to get responses. 
 
Analysis 
 The intention of this study was to analyze and examine the CERT data obtained from the 
County’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) survey, 
combined with data assembled from the cities’ responses to inquiries regarding their CERT 
programs, to see if there are quantifiable factors which are predictors of CERT participation in 
Santa Clara County, and what factors, if any, enhance or detract from CERT participation. 
 As noted in the Findings section, and as illustrated in Table 8, none of the cities reported 
CERT membership numbers consistent with or equal to the CERT memberships as suggested by 
the percentage of “yes” responses obtained in response to the CERT Question (Question #6) of 
the Local Hazard Mitigation Plan’s public survey.  Because of the low number of responses in 
each city, no correlation between suggested CERT memberships and the actual CERT 
membership could be found.  The LHMP survey response cannot be said to be a genuine 
indicator of CERT participation in Santa Clara County.    
 However, referencing back to Table 7, a potential predictor of CERT participation could 
be attributed to the age of the program in the respective cities.  The City of San Jose’s, (pop. 
952,612), CERT program, known as San Jose Prepared! has existed since 1994.  Prior to that, in 
1986, the San Jose Fire Department had a door-to-door preparedness campaign with an 
emergency preparedness handout.  San Jose Prepared! has trained thousands of people, (the 
count was over 5,000 in 2006 according to Dr. Frances Edwards, former Director of San Jose’s 
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Office of Emergency Services)(F. Edwards, personal communication, November 17, 2012), with 
the current roster of active members at 1,424.  
 The City of Mountain View’s current roster of active CERT members is reported as being 
914, which is not an insignificant number, in a city with a population of 74,000 when compared 
to the other cities in the county.  Prior to adoption of the current FEMA CERT curriculum in 
2001, the city had a Neighborhood Disaster Preparedness program which ran from 1995 to 2001.  
So, like San Jose, Mountain View has had some variation of a volunteer emergency preparedness 
program for a significant amount of time.  
 The City of Santa Clara’s (pop.116,468) CERT program, known as HEAT (Home 
Emergency Assistance Team), is another example of a program with longevity, having existed 
since 1995.  The city has had a total of 741 people complete the course, and estimates the current 
active roster between 20-50 volunteers.                   
 Sunnyvale, (pop. 142,287), the city with the highest percentage, 75.2%, of survey 
respondents who said “yes” they were members of CERT (Table 4), has a long-standing CERT 
program called SNAP (Sunnyvale Neighbors Actively Prepare), that has been in existence since 
1986 (F. Edwards, personal communication, November 17, 2012).  The city currently has enough 
interested residents to hold 3 classes a year, with each class containing about 21-40 participants.  
The city estimates it has trained well over 1,000 people, and the current count of active members 
is 250 (City of Sunnyvale, 2012b).    
 What may also be a factor in Sunnyvale’s level of CERT participation is the strong and 
active base of neighborhood associations—currently totaling 26.  (Sunnyvale Neighborhoods, 
2012).  The neighborhood associations encourage residents to get to know their neighbors and 
become involved in their communities, through such programs as SNAP.  Referencing back to 
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Table 1, predictably, San Jose as the county’s most populated city, had the highest number of 
responses to the LHMP survey—144.  The county’s third most populous city, Santa Clara, with a 
population of 116,468, registered a disappointing 24 respondents to the LHMP survey.  
However, Sunnyvale, , with approximately 800,000 fewer residents than San Jose, had only 36 
fewer respondents than San Jose,-for a total of 108-who answered the  on-line survey questions, 
suggestive of an involved and networked community, possibly attributable to the neighborhood 
associations.    
 As another possible source for CERT program participation predictors, the demographics 
of the communities were examined.  Table 9 below provides population, median income, home 
ownership rates, and education levels for the fifteen cities in Santa Clara County.  Continuing to 
look at Sunnyvale, Table 10 shows Sunnyvale ranks 2
nd
 in population behind first place San Jose 
in Santa Clara County.  For median incomes, Sunnyvale ranks 11
th
 in the county, as shown in 
Table 11, and ranks 13th in home ownership rates and 9th in percentage of population with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, as shown in  Tables 12 and 13 respectively.  There is no discernible 
pattern to the city’s demographic rankings that could be considered a factor of significance in 
Sunnyvale’s level of SNAP participation, or Sunnyvale’s response numbers to the LHMP survey.  
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  Table 9:  Demographics of cities in Santa Clara County 
 
City Population Median 
Income 
Home 
Ownership 
Rate 
Bachelor’s 
Degree or 
Higher 
Campbell 39,968 $79,464 52.1% 43.9% 
 
Cupertino 
  
59,220 $120,201 64.6% 74.7% 
Gilroy 48,821 
 
$75,483 62.1% 23.8% 
Los Altos 
  
29,431 $149,964 85.5% 78.2% 
Los Altos 
Hills 
7,922 $218,077 88.1% 83.3% 
Los Gatos 
 
29,424 $122,875 62.2% 66.2% 
Milpitas 
 
66,790 $94,589 66.6% 39.3% 
Monte Sereno 
 
3,341 $181,719 90% 71.4% 
Morgan Hill 
 
37,882 $94,301 74.3% 38.8% 
Mountain 
View 
74,066 $91,446 42.2% 59.4% 
Palo Alto 
  
65,412 $120,670 58.0% 79.3% 
San Jose 
 
952,612 $80,864 59.5% 36.6% 
Santa Clara 
 
116,468 $89,004 45.8% 49.2% 
Saratoga 
  
30,401 $145,023 84.7% 76.8% 
Sunnyvale 
  
142,287 $90,174 48.9% 56.1% 
 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 U.S. Census; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 
 American Community Survey 
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Table 10:   
Santa Clara cities sorted by 
population 
 
 Table 11:  
Santa Clara cities sorted by median 
income 
Rank City Population  Rank City Median 
Income 
1  San Jose 952,612 1 Los Altos 
Hills 
$218,077  
2 Sunnyvale 142,287 2 Monte 
Sereno 
$181,719  
3 Santa 
Clara 
116,468 3 Los Altos $149,964  
4 Mountain 
View 
74,066 4 Saratoga $145,023  
5 Milpitas 66,790 5 Los Gatos $122,875  
6 Palo Alto 65,412 6 Palo Alto $120,670  
7 Cupertino 59,220 7 Cupertino $120,201  
8 Gilroy 48,821 8 Milpitas $94,589  
9 Campbell 39,968 9 Morgan 
Hill 
$94,301  
10 Morgan 
Hill 
37,882 10 Mountain 
View 
$91,446  
11 Saratoga 30,401 11 Sunnyvale $90,174  
12 Los Altos 29,431 12 Santa 
Clara 
$89,004  
13 Los Gatos 29,424 13 San Jose $80,864  
14 Los Altos 
Hills 
7,922 14 Campbell $79,464  
15 Monte 
Sereno 
3,341 15 Gilroy $75,483  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 U.S. Census; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010  American 
Community Survey 
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Table 12:  
Santa Clara County cities sorted by 
Home Ownership Rate 
 Table 13: 
Santa Clara County cities sorted by 
% of population with a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher 
Rank City Home 
Ownership 
Rate 
 Rank City Bachelor’s 
Degree or 
Higher 
1 Monte Sereno 90.00% 1 Los Altos 
Hills 
83.30% 
2 Los Altos Hills 88.10% 2 Palo Alto 79.30% 
3 Los Altos 85.50% 3 Los Altos 78.20% 
4 Saratoga 84.70% 4 Saratoga 76.80% 
5 Morgan Hill 74.30% 5 Cupertino 74.70% 
6 Milpitas 66.60% 6 Monte 
Sereno 
71.40% 
7 Cupertino 64.60% 7 Los Gatos 66.20% 
8 Los Gatos 62.20% 8 Mountain 
View 
59.40% 
9 Gilroy 62.10% 9 Sunnyvale 56.10% 
10 San Jose 59.50% 10 Santa Clara 49.20% 
11 Palo Alto 58.00% 11 Campbell 43.90% 
12 Campbell 52.10% 12 Milpitas 39.30% 
13 Sunnyvale 48.90% 13 Morgan Hill 38.80% 
14 Santa Clara 45.80% 14 San Jose 36.60% 
15 Mountain View 42.20% 15 Gilroy 23.80% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 U.S. Census; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010  American 
Community Survey 
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 Yet, when examining the three cities which had the highest percentages of responses to 
“No, I am not interested in being a CERT member,” more of a pattern emerges.  The three cities 
with the highest percentages of “No, not interested” responses were Campbell (65%), Santa 
Clara (58.3%), and San Jose (56.3%).   With the exception of population size ranking, all three 
cities rank in the lower third of Santa Clara County for median income, home ownership rates, 
and education.  Figure 1 diagrams the three cities and their rankings.  This data supports the 
argument made by scholars that one of the predictors of disaster preparedness is income (Ablah, 
et al., 2009).  
 Cities with highest percentage of “No, not interested in CERT” responses 
 
 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
           (Fig. 1) 
 
 What is interesting is when Sunnyvale’s rankings are added, that city’s rankings are very 
similar to Campbell, San Jose and Santa Clara.  See Fig. 2 below. 
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Cities with highest percentage of “No, not interested in CERT” responses including 
Sunnyvale 
 
 
 
 
          (Fig. 2) 
 
 Yet Sunnyvale had the highest percentage (75.2%) of respondents who said they were a 
member of CERT, along with one of the lowest percentages (11.4%) of respondents who said 
they were not interested in becoming a CERT member---(Los Altos was the lowest with zero 
responses, and Los Gatos was the second lowest with 9.5%, see Table 6).   This observation 
suggests that longevity of the program, combined with an additional factor such as active and 
visible neighborhood programs and events, tends to enhance CERT participation. 
 By comparison, the Town of Los Gatos (pop. 29,424), reports 222 active CERT 
members, an impressive number in a town this size and considering that the CERT program has 
only been in existence since 2003. Surprisingly, the Los Gatos response percentage for “yes, I 
am a member of CERT” was only 33.3%, yet the town ranked first for “Not a member, but 
would like to learn more” with 57.1% of respondents wanting more information.  Los Gatos 
rankings for home ownership and education were midway—8th for home ownership rates, and 7th 
for education.(Tables 11 & 12)  However, Los Gatos ranked in the top third for median income, 
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coming in at 5
th
 countywide.(Table 11).  In fact, the top five respondents to “yes, I am a member 
of CERT”, ranked in the top half for median incomes with the exception of Sunnyvale, which 
ranks 11
th
 in the countywide ranking (Table 11).  This observation suggests that wealthier 
communities have a population more inclined to participate in community enhancing programs 
such as CERT, in the absence of additional supportive programs or organizations, than do less 
wealthy communities. 
 
Conclusion  
  This research examined the level of emergency preparedness of Santa Clara County cities 
with regards to their participation in a CERT program, and attempted to discover potential 
factors indicative of predicting an individual’s CERT participation or non-participation. Utilizing 
the Managerial Audit principle, this paper examined and evaluated the current level of CERT 
participation within Santa Clara County by examining CERT data obtained from the County’s 
Office of Emergency Services (OES) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) survey, in 
combination with data assembled from the cities’ responses to inquiries regarding their CERT 
programs. As a managerial audit does not measure compliance, but rather may challenge and 
question the “status quo”, (Sylvia and Sylvia, 2004), recommendations based on the data 
observed and included in the Findings and Analysis sections are suggested within this 
Conclusion component.   
 The next natural or man-made disaster is going to have people looking to their first 
responders for immediate aid and assistance.  However, local first-responders are likely to be 
initially overwhelmed, as was seen in disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, Loma Prieta and more 
recently, Hurricane Sandy.  During and after a major disaster, citizens will try to help 
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themselves, their family and neighbors, however, untrained and unprepared volunteers can 
compromise the safety of themselves and others, as was seen following the 1985 Mexico City 
earthquake in which 100 volunteers perished trying to help others (CERT Los Angeles, 2012b) 
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012b).  Not only do education, training and 
preparedness save lives, but they produce a public that becomes an asset instead of a liability 
when disaster strikes. Substantial literature exists on preparedness measures undertaken at the 
national and state levels, yet, truly, “emergency preparedness begins at the local level” (Santa 
Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010, p. 1).   Individuals can no longer think of the government 
as the “cavalry” coming to the rescue after a disaster.  Today’s realities, whether governmental, 
economic, demographic, or societal, have created a world where “a government-centric approach 
to disaster management will not be enough to meet the challenges posed by a catastrophic 
incident” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011, p.2).  In other words, the general 
public needs to take responsibility to “...decrease their own vulnerability and assist in the overall 
community response” (Haddow et al., 2011, p. 101).  CERT is one avenue for self and 
community reliance in disaster and emergency preparedness.  
 FEMA has long recognized the value of CERT teams, referring to them as, “a solid 
example of a trained volunteer resource” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2012b).  At the 
local level, a 2010 Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Report on disaster preparedness 
recommended that residents “learn to prepare for emergencies…assume responsibility for their 
own welfare…”  (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010, p. 4), and participate in their local 
CERT (Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury, 2010).   
 FEMA’s current philosophical approach to emergency management, Whole Community, 
embraces emergency management as a model based in the “grass-roots” concept.  Whole 
Community recognizes that “successful, connected and committed communities…can 
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collectively achieve better outcomes in times of crises, while enhancing the resilience of our 
communities and the Nation” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011, p. 23).  FEMA’s 
Whole Community report, A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Management:  
Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action  is not the definitive final word on emergency 
management, rather it is a starting point to help emergency management practitioners meet the 
challenges of Whole Community at the local level (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2011).      
 The starting point for this study of CERT level of participation in Santa Clara County 
was the results of an on-line survey that was part of the County of Santa Clara’s annex to the 
2010 Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) Local Hazard Mitigation Plan, Taming 
Natural Disasters. As part of the Plan development process, in November 2010, the Local Planning 
Team (LPT) used the online survey to “request public input regarding concern for hazard risk” 
(County of Santa Clara, 2011a, p. 3-19).  Question 6 of the survey specifically targeted CERT, 
asking respondents about their level of CERT involvement, i.e. were they involved, not involved 
but would like more information, or not interested in CERT. By January 17, 2011, the County 
had received 541 responses, out of over 1.7 million residents.  While this response was not 
statistically significant it is an interesting reflection of community interest in and involvement in 
emergency preparedness.  However, given the few pathways that were used for informing the 
public about the survey, it is not surprising that CERT members were overrepresented in survey 
responses, since CERT membership networks were one way survey participation was solicited.   
 In conjunction with the survey results, an examination of CERT programs for the fifteen 
cities in Santa Clara County was conducted.  Endeavoring to determine factors which affect 
and/or predict levels of CERT participation, cities were polled on  age of their CERT program, 
number of people trained, number of current active CERT members, cost of the program and 
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whether or not the city maintained contact with current active members, and if so, how?  Data 
from thirteen of the fifteen cities was received and examined for this study. 
 One of the scholarly articles used as research for this paper, “Factors Predicting 
Individual Emergency Preparedness:  A Multi-State Analysis of 2006 BRFSS Data” had not only 
concluded that individuals were not as prepared as they perceived themselves to be, but that 
“income and age were important predictors of disaster preparedness” (Ablah et al, 2009, p. 317).  
In this study, respondent age was not considered, but income levels were, and they did appear to 
have an influence on the level of CERT participation within the cities.  As seen in the data from 
the Town of Los Gatos, the town reports that it currently has 222 active CERT members,  an 
impressive number in a town of just fewer than 30,000 residents and when compared with the 
other cities in the county (in reference to Table 7).  Considering median income, Los Gatos 
ranked in the top third of the county, coming in at 5
th.  
(Table 11), and in fact, the top five 
respondents to “yes, I am a member of CERT”, ranked in the top half for median incomes, with 
the exception of Sunnyvale, which ranked 11
th 
(Table 11). 
 Three cities, Campbell, San Jose, and Santa Clara with median income levels ranking in 
the bottom third of the county, registered the highest percentages of respondents who answered 
“No, not interested in CERT” in the  Local Hazard Mitigation Plan (LHMP) survey.  These three 
cities were also in the bottom third of responses to the “Yes, I am a member of CERT” response 
choice.  These observations suggest that individuals who are at the lower end of the income 
spectrum are not as likely to be participants in emergency preparedness.  Jeanne-Marie Col, 
Associate Professor at John Jay College in New York, succinctly sums up this low income-low 
preparedness connection:  “A poor person who cannot put food on the table or send their kids to 
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school is not going to be much interested in well-stocked go-bags” (J.Col, personal 
communication, November 18, 2012).  
 The question then remains as to how to engage the vulnerable segment of the population-
-the poor, the young, special needs and the aged population--in emergency preparedness 
programs such as CERT?   One possible solution is for communities to use the strategic themes 
that are the cornerstone of FEMA’s Whole Community approach, such as understanding 
community complexity and recognizing the community’s capabilities and needs.  Unless and 
until local officials and community leaders identify their vulnerable populations, and address the 
obstacles to their participation in emergency preparedness, the vulnerable populations will 
continue to be at increased risk from hazards and disasters.  After Hurricane Katrina, thousands 
were affected, but the “individuals in poverty were most affected by the hurricane” (Burney, et 
al.,2007, p. 5).  
 In disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the wealthy and the middle class are not as 
impacted as are the poor because they generally have more information, more resources and tend 
to be better prepared.  As mentioned above, the top five respondents to “yes, I am a member of 
CERT”, ranked in the top half of countywide median incomes (Table 11).  As these populations 
already exhibit a tendency to engage in emergency preparedness programs such as CERT, 
greater efforts can be made to increase participation from the wealthy and middle class, thereby 
creating a situation where the wealthy and middle class are self-sufficient, freeing up resources 
which can then be directed at the vulnerable population. 
 Ideally, all members of the community would participate in CERT programs, however, in 
communities with a greater number of poor people, it would require more work to increase 
CERT participation, along with taking longer to reach and engage this population.  This is a tall 
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order in these economic times when many cities are running on bare bones staffing.  Yet, if cities 
make the effort to engage the poor and vulnerable in minimal preparedness actions, such as 
CERT, the cities, in effect are making a low investment now in order to achieve a high benefit 
later (J.Col, personal communication, November 18, 2012). 
 Another potential predictor of CERT participation that was explored was longevity of the 
program within the individual cities, the theory being that a long-lived program would engender 
community support and participation by virtue of its familiarity. This does not appear to be the 
case, as demonstrated by cities like Santa Clara, which have had a CERT program since 1995, 
but only self-reported 20-50 active members; while cities like Los Gatos, where the CERT 
program has only existed since 2003, report 222 active members.   
 Within this study, Sunnyvale appeared to be something of an anomaly.  The city ranked 
in the bottom third for median income, and theoretically, should have had a response similar to 
Campbell, Santa Clara and San Jose of a high rate of “not interested in CERT” responses and a 
low rate of “yes, I am a member of CERT.”  Yet, Sunnyvale registered the highest response 
percentage to the “yes, I am a member of CERT” question, and one of the lowest percentages for 
the “no, I am not interested in CERT” question.  Sunnyvale does have one of the oldest CERT 
programs in the county, called SNAP, in operation since 1986, but as was observed in other 
cities with long-lived programs like Santa Clara, that detail in and of itself does not appear to be 
a significant predictor of CERT participation.  What Sunnyvale does have are 26 active and 
engaged neighborhood associations.  These neighborhood associations appear to present an 
additional layer of community involvement that surmounts the obstacles suggested by the 
median income levels of the community. These observations suggest that when CERT program 
administration and recruitment is combined with additional community outreach efforts and 
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programs like Sunnyvale’s neighborhood associations, CERT participation appears to be 
enhanced. 
 Finally, cities do not need to start from scratch in searching for means to enhance their 
CERT participation, as many cities already have resources and tools that can be used to augment 
their current CERT recruitment efforts.  The City of San Jose has 51 community centers located 
throughout the city that can be venues for CERT recruitment and/or training.  Numerous cities 
have local neighborhood papers and newsletters, The Los Gatos Weekly Times, The Cupertino 
Courier, for example, while other cities have begun to establish and use local “Patch” and 
Yahoo! Groups as a means for neighborhood residents to communicate with each other.  These 
are all potential outreach resources.  But, as tempting as it may be to disseminate information via 
the Internet, cities should first consider the results of a resident’s survey done in Mountain View 
in 2006. One of the questions asked was, “How can the City of Mountain View provide you with 
information to help you prepare for an emergency?” (City of Mountain View, 2006, p.57). The 
top choice of forty-five percent of respondents was to have the information mailed to them 
through mediums such as pamphlets and newsletters.  The second choice, at 17%, was to receive 
the information through the City’s website (City of Mountain View, 2006).  These numbers 
illustrate, while efficient and economical, the internet is not always the best choice for a city to 
use in communicating with its residents about emergency preparedness. 
 
 California is a seismically ticking time bomb that will sooner or later be rocked by “The 
Big One.”  At that point, the answer to the question of “when?” is going to become “right now!”  
When that happens, emergency preparedness programs such as CERT, can make the difference 
between being a survivor or becoming a statistic.     
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